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Previous research has shown that higher levels of firm globalization lead to a lower cost of 
private debt. However, this research generally treats globalization as a homogeneous attribute 
ignoring the specific countries in which a multinational corporation (MNC) operates. Using a 
sample of U.S. MNCs from 1999 through 2017, we relax this assumption and find that while the 
results from prior research hold with regards to the level of an MNC’s operations in segments 
reported at the regional or continent-wide level, the level of an MNC’s operations in countries 
with low institutional quality is associated with a higher cost of bank debt. Our results are robust 
to controlling for firms’ choice to operate in countries with low institutional quality using self-
selection models and propensity score matching. In additional testing we find that the level of 
MNCs operations in countries with low institutional quality is negatively associated with the 
inclusion of collateral requirements in private lending agreements, but is not associated with the 
maturity of the loan or the number of covenants included in the lending agreement. Finally, we 
find that firms’ segment disclosure choices vary around new loan issuances in a manner 
consistent with management being aware that operations in low institutional quality are 
perceived by lenders to indicate higher credit risk. 
 






A significant amount of research has investigated the effect of globalization on the cost of 
debt to multinational companies (MNCs) (e.g., Reeb et al., 2001; Mansi and Reeb, 2002; Li et 
al., 2011). The overall tenor of the results of these studies is that globalization is associated with 
a lower cost of both public and private debt. These studies measure globalization using firms’ 
total foreign assets, foreign sales, or the number of foreign segments, implicitly assuming that 
the effect of globalization is independent of the countries in which MNCs operate. However, 
MNCs have been increasingly investing in emerging markets with sales of foreign subsidiaries in 
emerging markets representing 20% of total foreign sales for MNCs in 2009 (Barefoot and 
Mataloni Jr., 2011), and foreign direct investment in emerging and developing markets 
increasing from $340 billion in 2005 to $703 billion in 2013 (United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 2013). As a result, MNCs are increasingly operating in a 
diverse mix of political, economic, and legal environments and prior research presents evidence 
that country specific factors are associated with the attributes of debt financing (Aggarwal and 
Goodell, 2009; Chui et al. 2016). This brings into question the assumption that globalization is a 
homogeneous construct and raises the concern that variation in legal and institutional quality 
across countries may affect the relationship between globalization and the cost of debt. 
Therefore, the objective of this study is to investigate the extent to which the effect of 
globalization on the terms of MNCs’ private debt contracts is affected by the set of countries in 
which they operate, and specifically the effect of operations in countries with low institutional 
quality.  
Investigating the effect of the specific set of countries that MNCs operate in on private 




firms as new debt issuances dwarf new equity issuances (Graham et al., 2008), and bank debt is, 
on average, the largest source of debt financing (Houston and James, 1996; Graham et al., 2008). 
Therefore, an understanding of how the nature of MNC globalization affects the cost of private 
debt is important for firms, regulators, and academics. Second, banks represent a more informed 
set of creditors than public debtholders and have access to private information regarding 
borrowers, leading to lower information asymmetry (Leland and Pyle, 1977; Rajan, 1992; 
Demiroglu and James, 2010). Banks are also active monitors of firms and can influence firms’ 
operating and financing decisions (Chava and Roberts, 2008; Nini et al., 2012). As a result, an 
investigation of private lending terms provides insight into how an informed and influential set 
of capital providers evaluate MNC’s operations in countries with lower institutional quality.  
Prior literature provides several theoretical arguments regarding the effect that 
globalization may have on the costs of private debt. First, MNCs provide creditors’ access to 
markets they may be constrained from otherwise accessing which should result in lower costs of 
private debt (Errunza and Senbet, 1981; 1984). Second, globalization internalizes transactions 
related to intangible assets where proprietary information would lead to substantial transaction 
costs increasing the value of the MNC which also should result in lower costs of private debt 
(Caves, 1979).  Finally, global diversification increases the risk of agency costs to MNCs which 
should result in higher costs of debt (Harris et al., 1982). Motivated by these theories, Li et al. 
(2011) investigate the association between an MNCs level of globalization and the terms of 
private lending agreements, and find that higher levels of globalization are associated with more 
favorable lending terms.  
We argue that treating globalization as a homogenous construct provides an incomplete 




argue that the value of internalizing transactions related to intangible assets is lower and agency 
costs are higher when globalization is achieved through operations in countries with low 
institutional quality than when globalization is achieved through operations in countries with 
high institutional quality. Therefore, we predict that the association between an MNC’s level of 
globalization and the cost of private debt will be associated with the institutional quality of the 
countries in which an MNC operates. Specifically, we argue that, in contrast to the findings in Li 
et al. (2011), MNC’s operations in countries with low institutional quality will be associated with 
a higher cost of debt. 
We perform our study using a sample of 15,715 private debt contracts entered into by 
2,982 public U.S. companies during the years 1999 – 2017, including 8,668 debt contracts 
entered into by multinational firms. We measure the strength of country-level institutional 
quality using the creditor rights index from Djankov et al. (2007), the property rights index from 
Kaufmann et al. (2011), and the per capita income level of the country as an outcome variable 
that reflects institutional quality (Glaeser et al., 2004). We identify countries as having low 
institutional quality if any of these three measures reflect low institutional quality. We measure 
the level of MNCs operations in countries with low institutional quality using each of: the 
number of segments in low institutional quality countries reported by the firm, the ratio of 
reported sales in low institutional quality countries to total sales, and the ratio of reported assets 
in low institutional quality countries to total assets. We then perform tests using multivariate 
regressions controlling for loan and firm specific factors that prior research finds to be related to 
private lending terms. To isolate the effect of globalization in low institutional quality countries, 




and non-country-specific globalization (i.e., foreign segments reported at a regional or continent-
wide level) as additional control variables in our tests.  
Our results indicate that the relationship between the level of an MNC’s globalization and 
the cost of private debt relates systematically to the countries in which MNCs operate. Consistent 
with the findings in Li et al. (2011), and their argument that MNCs provide lenders an 
opportunity to diversify their lending portfolio, we find that the level of U.S. MNCs’ 
globalization in segments reported at the regional or continent-wide level is associated with a 
lower cost of private debt, measured using interest rate spreads. However, in contrast to Li et al. 
(2011), we find that the level of U.S. MNCs’ globalization in countries with low institutional 
quality is associated with a higher cost of debt. These results hold when we measure MNCs’ 
globalization in countries with low institutional quality using either the number of segments or 
the percentage of an MNC’s sales that are in countries with low institutional quality.  
It is unlikely that our multivariate results are driven by reverse causality since it would 
not be rational for a firm to operate in a low institutional quality country in order to obtain a 
higher cost of debt. However, it is possible that our multivariate regression results are driven by 
an omitted correlated variable related to the firm’s choice to operate abroad. Therefore, we 
perform multiple additional analyses to control unobservable factors related to firms’ choice to 
operate internationally. First, using our entire sample, we control for firms’ choice to operate 
globally using a Heckman (1979) selection model. Second, including only the MNCs in our 
sample, we control for firms’ choice to operate in a low institutional quality country using a 
Heckman selection model. Finally, using only the MNCs in our sample, we use matching 
analyses, including propensity score matching and Mahalanobis distance matching. In each case, 




favorable interest rate spreads increasing our confidence that lenders view the operations of U.S. 
MNCs in countries with low institutional quality as being associated with higher credit risk.1  
 We then leverage non-price features of private debt contracts: maturity, loan collateral 
security requirements, and the number of covenants included in the debt contract, to provide a 
richer understanding of the relationship between the set of countries that MNCs operate in and 
firm credit risk. Li et al. (2011) present evidence that firms’ overall level of globalization is 
negatively associated with the likelihood of the loan being secured and the number of covenants 
included in the debt contract and is not associated with loan maturity. We find no evidence of an 
association between globalization in countries with low or high institutional quality and loan 
maturity or the number of covenants included in the debt contract. However, we find a subtle 
relationship between loan security requirements and globalization, indicating that the role of 
collateral in private debt is influenced both by the characteristics of the countries in which an 
MNC operates and the nature of their operations in these countries.  
 Specifically, we find a significant negative association between globalization in countries 
with low institutional quality and security requirements when we use foreign sales to measure 
globalization, and a stronger negative association when we measure globalization using foreign 
assets. However, we find no evidence of an association between loan security requirements and 
globalization in countries with high institutional quality using any of our measures of 
globalization, or globalization in low institutional quality countries when we measure 
globalization using the number of segments. This result is consistent with property laws, and 
 
1 We do not argue that MNC’s operating in countries with low institutional quality are behaving sub-optimally. 
Operations in countries with low institutional quality may offer firms benefits that compensate for the higher costs 
of debt, such as: cheaper labor, access to raw materials, or greater opportunities for value creation. Rather, we argue 
that whether globalization provides benefits or costs to the firm, in terms of the cost of private debt, depends on the 




their enforcement, in countries with low institutional quality reducing the perceived value of 
collateral in those countries. Therefore, the negative association between globalization and 
collateral found by Li et al. (2011) may reflect collateral in countries with low institutional 
quality representing lower, or more uncertain, value to private lenders.  
Finally, the guidance on segment disclosures under Accounting Standard Codification 
paragraph 280 (ASC 280) allows firms flexibility in identifying reportable segments. In 
additional analyses, we find that MNCs report fewer segments in countries with low institutional 
quality in the years around private debt issuances than in other years. This result is consistent 
with MNCs being aware of the less favorable lending terms associated with operations in 
countries with low institutional quality and using the flexibility in the accounting guidance to 
reduce the salience of their operations in these countries. Overall, our results support the 
inference that globalization by U.S. MNCs is not homogeneous, and that the effect of 
globalization on the attributes of private debt contracts varies as a function of the legal and 
institutional features of the countries in which MNCs operate.  
Our findings contribute to a growing number of cross-country studies that investigate the 
effect of country-specific legal institutions on public and private loan contracts obtained by 
domestic firms (Qian and Strahan, 2007; Bae and Goyal, 2009; Zaher et al., 2020). Our study is 
not a cross-country study in the sense that all of the firms in our sample are domiciled in the U.S. 
However, we are able to extend the cross-country research by isolating the effect of operations in 
countries with low institutional quality on the attributes of private debt contracts holding 
constant the institutional quality of the company’s country of domicile.2 We also contribute to 
 
2 Limiting our sample to U.S. MNC’s also holds constant the culture of the country in which the corporation is 
domiciled. This mitigates concerns that our results may reflect relations between lending terms and culture found in 




the literature investigating the impact of globalization on firm value (Denis et al., 2002; Mansi 
and Reeb, 2002), specifically the value of globalization as assessed by the firm’s primary source 
of external capital, banks (Li et al., 2011). By removing the assumption that globalization is 
homogeneous we are able to provide evidence that the relationship between globalization and the 
cost of private debt relates systematically to the countries in which MNCs operate. Finally, 
Gande et al. (2009) provide evidence that MNCs with operations in countries with stronger 
creditor rights have higher Tobin-Qs. They posit, but do not test, that this results from these 
companies being able to obtain debt capital at a lower cost. We provide direct evidence 
supporting this supposition.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the following section, we discuss 
theoretical and empirical evidence regarding the association between firm globalization and the 
cost of private debt and evaluate the potential effect of MNCs’ operations in low institutional 
quality countries on that association. In section 3, we present our research design including a 
discussion of our self-selection and matching techniques. We discuss our sample selection 
procedure and provide descriptive statistics in section 4, and present our primary results in 
section. 5. In the sixth section, we present additional analyses investigating the association 
between MNCs’ operations in countries with low institutional quality and non-price features of 
private debt, including collateralization, loan maturity, and the use of loan covenants. In the 
seventh section, we present our analysis of firms’ segment disclosure choices to provide 
supporting evidence for our primary findings. The final section concludes.  
2. Firm globalization and the cost of private debt 
 Prior literature provides several theoretical arguments regarding the effect that 




consider both the effect that lending to an MNC may have on the lenders’ overall lending 
portfolio and on the effect that globalization may have on the value of the MNC.  
 The theory of imperfect world capital markets focuses on the ability of MNCs to 
“complete” markets by providing lenders with indirect access to countries that they would 
otherwise be constrained from entering (Errunza and Senbet, 1981; 1984). If global capital 
markets were “perfect”, creditors could choose lending portfolios that would produce an optimal 
level of diversification. However, their ability to do so is limited by transaction costs related to 
information asymmetry and legal constraints on cross-country capital flows. Therefore, MNCs 
offer creditors an effective opportunity to improve the diversification of their lending portfolio 
and should be associated with a lower cost of debt. 
 In addition to the ability of globalization to add value to the lender based on its effect on 
the diversification of the banks’ loan portfolio, theory also supports globalization directly 
increasing the value of the MNC. Internalization theory (Caves, 1971) suggests that firms can 
increase their value by internalizing the markets for certain intangible assets (e.g., R&D and 
advertising expenditures) that are based on propriety information, such that they generate 
substantial transaction costs in arm’s length transactions. Globalization internalizes transactions 
related to these intangibles, avoiding these transaction costs and therefore increasing the value of 
the firm. Therefore, internalization theory indicates that globalization should be viewed 
favorably by creditors and be associated with a lower cost of debt. 
 In contrast to the above theories, which predict that banks will value globalization 
positively, agency theory suggests that banks may view globalization negatively. The additional 
complexity of a globalized firm creates information asymmetry between local managers and 




globalization gives managers access to more internal markets across which to allocate a firm’s 
resources, thereby making it more difficult for banks to monitor managerial decisions and 
increasing the risk of empire building, asset substitution, and self-dealing. These higher agency 
costs should be associated with a higher cost of debt. 
 Motivated by these theories, Li et al. (2011) examine the effect of overall globalization 
on the cost of bank debt. They find that the overall level of an MNC’s globalization is negatively 
associated with the cost of private debt. Based on these results, they infer that the benefits of 
globalization resulting from a firm’s ability to internalize intangible assets and to “complete” 
markets for lenders outweigh any increased agency costs. The measures of globalization in their 
study treat globalization as homogenous, i.e., they do not allow for the effect of globalization to 
vary depending on the countries in which an MNC operates. However, prior studies investigating 
the effect of country-level factors indicate that public and private lending agreements are 
sensitive to the legal, economic, political, and cultural differences between countries in which 
borrowing firms are domiciled.  
Investigating private loans in 43 countries, Qian and Strahan (2007) present evidence that 
firms domiciled in countries with weaker creditor protection obtain private loans with higher 
interest rates. Further, Laeven and Majnoni (2005) present evidence that interest rate spreads are 
negatively related to judicial efficiency in the firm’s country of domicile. Similarly, Lobo et al. 
(2020) find that bank loans in countries with weaker debt enforcement have larger interest rate 
spreads. The findings in these papers bring into question the extent to which the effects of 
globalization on the cost of private debt are conditional on the institutional quality of the 




 It is possible that the results from these cross-country studies do not generalize to U.S. 
MNC’s because loan contracts between banks and U.S. MNCs are subject to U.S. law. As a 
result, the relatively strong creditor rights and enforcement mechanisms in the U.S. offer 
protection to private lenders. However, operations in countries with low institutional quality 
could still have an effect on private lending if they moderate the effect of globalization on the 
value of the MNC by increasing agency costs or reducing the benefit to the firm of internalizing 
intangible assets.  
Consistent with operations in countries with low institutional quality reducing the value 
of internalization of intangible assets, Gao and Chou (2015) present evidence that the innovation 
efficiency of MNCs with operations in developing countries or countries with weak patent 
protection has smaller valuation benefits than innovation efficiency of MNCs with operations in 
developed countries and countries with strong patent protection. Consistent with this result, Chu 
et al. (2020) find that strong patent protections are more likely to be associated with innovation 
in countries with a high level of economic development.  
In addition, the increased risk of self-dealing and the increased cost of monitoring 
operations in countries with low institutional quality means that the agency costs resulting from 
globalization are greater for MNCs with operations in countries with low institutional quality. 
Supporting this inference, Amiram and Owens (2018) present evidence that income smoothing is 
associated with a lower cost of debt in countries with a low risk of management self-dealing, but 
a higher cost of debt in countries with a high risk of management self-dealing.  
The reduced benefits of internalization of transactions and increased agency costs are 
likely to lead to significantly lower valuation benefits to MNCs with operations in countries with 




affected by the countries in which MNCs operate, Gande et al. (2009) find that MNCs with 
operations in countries with weak creditor rights have smaller valuation benefits, measured using 
Tobin’s-Q, than MNCs that operate in countries with stronger creditor rights.  
In addition to having an effect on the value of MNCs, operations in countries with low 
institutional quality also affect MNCs’ financing decisions. Desai et al., (2004) present evidence 
that MNCs with foreign affiliates in countries with underdeveloped capital markets or weak 
creditor rights increase the amount of borrowing by the parent company in order to fund the 
subsidiary rather than bear the higher cost of debt that would result if the subsidiary was financed 
using domestic loans. This increased leveraging of the parent company generates an increased 
risk to the lender which should lead to a higher cost of debt. Based on these effects of operations 
in countries with low institutional quality on the value of internalization, the magnitude of 
agency costs, and the financing decisions of U.S. MNCs we expect that the price component of 
private loans to U.S. MNCs will be positively associated with their level of operations in 
countries with low institutional quality. 
3. Research design 
3.1. Identification of operations in countries with low institutional quality 
In order to evaluate the effect of globalization in countries with low institutional quality 
on private lending agreements we first identify the extent to which MNCs have such operations. 
We use segment disclosures required under ASC 280 to identify the countries in which MNCs 
operate and to determine their level of operation, i.e., assets and sales, in each country. We 
define institutional quality broadly as a set of legal rules and social norms that promote economic 
development. Following prior literature, we determine the strength of institutional quality in the 




the protection of creditor rights, the protection of property rights, and the level of economic 
development (Qian and Strahan, 2007; Bae and Goyal, 2009; Djankov et al., 2007).  
We include creditor rights as a measure of institutional quality because the protection of 
creditor rights is a primary concern for creditors in evaluating their lending risk. We adopt our 
measure of creditor rights from Djankov et al. (2007). Djankov et al. (2007) find that the most 
important components of creditor rights are: that secured creditors are paid first following the 
liquidation of a bankrupt firm and secured creditors are able to seize collateral following an 
approved petition for reorganization without a court superseding or forestalling such action by 
imposing an automatic stay or “asset freeze.” Therefore, we designate a segment as being in a 
country with strong creditor rights if the country grants both of these powers to creditors in 
bankruptcy and in a country with weak creditor rights if the country fails to grant both of these 
rights. The data from Djankov et al. (2007) are available for the first six years of our sample; for 
all years following 2002, we use the creditor rights score as of 2003.3 
Bae and Goyal (2009) present evidence that legal enforcement plays a significant role in 
the pricing of private debt, therefore, we use property rights as our second measure of 
institutional quality. We measure country-level property rights based on a composite of the 
following measures from Kaufmann et al. (2011): government effectiveness, regulatory quality, 
rule of law, and control of corruption. We use these four measures because they incorporate both 
the de jure legal quality and the de facto quality of legal enforcement, and prior literature 
presents evidence that the institutional quality of a country depends on both the quality of the 
 
3 We acknowledge that this introduces potential measurement error. However, the correlation between 1998 and 
2003 creditor rights indices is 0.97 indicating that creditor rights are highly persistent, mitigating this concern. As an 
additional robustness test, we performed our primary analysis excluding creditor rights (i.e., measuring institutional 





laws as written and the level of legal enforcement (La Porta et al. 1997). We first calculate the 
average percentile rank of each of these four indicators for each country in each year of our 
sample. Then, following prior literature, we designate a country as having weak property rights if 
the country’s property rights are below the sample median (Hansen et al. 2015; Zaher et al. 
2020).4 
Finally, as we define high quality institutions as those that promote economic 
development, we include economic development as a reflective measure of institutional quality. 
We measure the economic development of a country using country classifications generated 
annually by the World Bank. Each year, the World Bank assigns countries to one of four groups 
based on the country’s estimated gross national income per capita (in U.S. dollars). The four 
groups are high, upper middle, lower middle, and low. We find that 76.8 percent of the segments 
in our sample are located in high-income countries. Therefore, we designate a segment as being 
in a country with low economic development if the country is in the three lowest income 
classifications as measured by the World Bank.5   
Since prior literature has demonstrated each of creditor rights, property rights, and 
economic development to be related to private debt contracting terms for domestic firms, we 
classify a country to have low institutional quality if it is classified as low under any of these 
three indicators.6 We then measure the level of an MNC’s operations in countries with low 
 
4 Since our sample is composed of U.S. MNCs, lenders may evaluate the property rights of the countries in which 
the MNCs operate relative to property rights in the U.S. Therefore, in untabulated robustness tests we designated 
countries as having weak property rights if the country’s percentile rank is two or more, or three or more, standard 
deviations below the U.S., and obtained results that support the same statistical inferences in both cases. 
5 Our findings are qualitatively unchanged if we classify a country as having low economic development only if it is 
in the lower middle, or low classification.  
6 In additional (untabulated) tests we perform our analyses classifying segments as being in countries with low 
institutional quality only if the country meets all three of the criteria used to determine low institutional quality and 





institutional quality using the number of operating segments the firm reports in countries with 
low institutional quality, and each of the firm’s sales and assets that they report for segments 
located in countries with low institutional quality as a percentage of their total sales and assets.  
3.2. Multivariate Regression Analysis  
 We use the following regression specification to evaluate the effect of U.S. MNC’s 
operations in countries with low institutional quality on the price component of private loans: 
LogSpread = β0 + β1LowInstGlob + β2HighInstGlob + β3NonSpecGlob +   (1) 
βi-jControls + βj-kIndustry + ε        
 We measure our dependent variable, the price component of private loans, using the 
natural log of the all-in-spread on the loan, LogSpread, measured using the “All-in Drawn” 
variable from DealScan which is the total amount paid in basis points over LIBOR including 
interest and any annual or facility fee. LowInstGlob is a generic variable representing the extent 
of U.S. MNC’s operations in low institutional quality countries, measured as each of: the number 
of operating segments that the firm reports in countries with low institutional quality, 
LowInstSeg, sales in low institutional quality countries divided by total sales, LowInstSales, and 
assets in low institutional quality countries divided by total assets, LowInstAssets. A positive 
coefficient on LowInstGlob, β1, would support our argument that higher levels of operations in 
countries with low institutional quality are associated with higher costs of private debt. To isolate 
the effect of operations in countries with low institutional quality and control for the effect of 
overall globalization on private lending terms documented in Li et al. (2011) we include controls 
for the level of foreign operations in countries with high institutional quality and the level of 
foreign operations that are not country specific. We measure these variables, HighInstGlob and 




operating segments reported for each classification of segment, the ratio of sales in each 
classification of segment to total sales, and the ratio of assets reported for each classification of 
segment to total assets.  
 In addition, we control for firm and loan characteristics that have been shown by prior 
literature to impact debt contracts (Strahan, 1999; Qian and Strahan, 2007; Bae and Goyal, 2009; 
Kim et al., 2011; Li et al., 2011). We measure firm Size using the natural log of the total assets of 
the firm in millions of U.S. dollars. Profitability is the ratio of operating income before 
depreciation to total assets. Leverage is the ratio of total long-term debt to total assets. We 
measure Tangibility as the ratio of net property, plant, and equipment to total assets. Consistent 
with Bae and Goyal (2009) and Li et al. (2011), we measure Market-to-Book by summing the 
public value of equity and book value of long-term debt, and dividing by total assets. We 
measure Return Volatility as the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the four years 
prior to loan inception. We control for the firm’s expected default risk using EDF (Expected 
Default Frequency). We measure EDF using the methodology proposed in Bharath and 
Shumway (2008) which calculates the firm’s expected probability of default based on the model 
proposed in Merton (1974) using as inputs: an estimated market value of the firm, the face value 
of the firm’s debt, an estimated expected annual return on the firm’s assets, and an estimated 
standard deviation of the value of the firm.  
 Following Francis et al. (2017), we control for overall macroeconomic conditions at the 
time the loan was originated by including the difference between the yield on AAA bonds and 
BAA bonds measured in the month of loan origination, DefSpread, and the difference between 
the yield on ten year U.S. treasury bonds and the yield on two year U.S. treasury bonds in the 




the financial crisis periods by including an indicator variable, TechBubble, equal to one for the 
years 1999 and 2000, and zero otherwise, and an indicator variable, FinCrisis, equal to one for 
the years 2007 and 2008, and zero otherwise.  
 Next, loan terms other than pricing are generally established based on negotiations 
between the firm and the lead bank in a syndicate, and the spread is subsequently determined in 
the process of recruiting other banks into the syndicate (Bharath et al., 2011). Therefore, we also 
control for the natural log of the loan amount, LogAmount, the natural log of the loan term in 
months, LogMaturity, and an indicator variable for secured loans, Secured. Finally, we include 
one-digit SIC code indicators, as well as indicators for the loan’s purpose (e.g., asset acquisition, 
takeover, debt restructuring, working capital, etc.) and the loan’s type (e.g., revolving loan, term 
loan, etc.). To address potential correlation in errors within firms we evaluate significance using 
robust standard errors clustered by firm. We present definitions for all variables used in our 
analysis in the Appendix. 
3.3. Analyses addressing potential self-selection bias 
 We argue that the strength of institutional quality in countries in which U.S. MNCs 
operate affects the cost of private debt. Since we argue that the level of operations in countries 
with low institutional quality will be associated with higher costs of debt it is unlikely that our 
findings could be driven by reverse causality. However, it is possible that unobservable firm 
characteristics may affect both the cost of a firm’s private debt and its choice of countries in 
which to operate. Therefore, we perform several additional tests to address this potential 
endogeneity. First, we control for firms’ choice to operate globally using the Heckman (1979) 
two-step treatment model using the same instrumental variables identified and validated by Li et 




modified versions of the instrumental variables used in Li et al. (2011) to control for firms’ 
choice to operate in low institutional quality countries. Finally, we use multiple matching 
techniques to compare the costs of debt of MNCs with operations in low institutional quality 
countries to MNCs with similar characteristics that do not operate in countries with low 
institutional quality.  
3.3.1. Heckman two-step model controlling for the choice to operate globally  
 We first address potential endogeneity related to firms’ choice to operate globally using 
the Heckman (1979) two-step treatment model. The two-step model requires the identification of 
variables that are significantly associated with the dependent variable in the first stage 
regression, firms’ choice to operate in foreign countries, but are not associated with the 
dependent variable in the second stage regression, the price component of private loans. To 
satisfy this exclusion requirement, we use the same three instrumental variables (IVs) identified 
by Li et al. (2011).    
 First, we use the percentage of firms in each industry-year that are multinational 
corporations, IndPercGlob, as an industry-level instrumental variable for total globalization and 
expect IndPercGlob to be positively associated with the level of a firm’s global operations. 
Second, we use the ratio of foreign exports from the state in which the firm’s headquarters is 
located to total U.S. exports, StateExp, as a geographic-level instrument for firms’ total level of 
globalization. This IV is motivated by prior literature supporting the intuition that firms with 
greater experience with international trade are more likely to become multinational firms 
(Blonigen, 2000; Rob and Vettas, 2003). We expect that a larger level of exports from the state 
in which a firm’s headquarters is located is positively associated with its likelihood of having 




minority interest, and 0 otherwise, Min_Int, as a firm-level instrument for firms’ total level of 
globalization. This IV is motivated by the intuition that acquisitions are often the most effective 
means for gaining access to foreign markets. Therefore, Min_Int, should be positively associated 
with a firms’ level of foreign operations. 
 We include these three instrumental variables in the first-stage equation used to estimate 
the likelihood of a firm being global, resulting in the following probit selection model: 
Globalization_Ind = β0 + β1IndPercGlob + β2StateExp + β3Min_Int +    (2) 
βi-jControls + βj-kIndustry + ε 
Globalization_Ind is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm is an MNC, and 0 
otherwise. We then use the results of this regression to calculate the inverse Mills ratio, IMR, and 
amend Equation (1) to include IMR as an additional control resulting in the following second-
stage outcome model:  
LogSpread = β0 + β1LowInstGlob + β2HighInstGlob + β3NonSpecGlob + β4IMR + (3) 
  βi-jControls + βj-kIndustry + ε                
 We perform this analysis using all firms in our sample. A positive coefficient β1 would 
support our hypothesis that operations in countries with low institutional quality are associated 
with higher costs of private debt. We include the same controls variables included in Equation 
(1) and 1-digit SIC code indicator variables in both the selection and outcome models and use 
robust standard errors clustered by firm in estimations of Eqs. (2) and (3). We use the number of 
operating segments, the asset ratio, and the sales ratio as alternative measures of globalization in 
our outcome regression.  






 While the prior analysis addresses potential omitted correlated variables related to firms’ 
choice to operate globally, it does not address unknown factors that may be specifically related 
with firms’ choice to operate in countries with low institutional quality. Therefore, we next 
modify our Heckman (1979) two-step analysis to address this concern. First, we include only 
MNCs in this analysis in order to focus on the choice to operate in countries with low 
institutional quality, given that the firm operates internationally. Second, we replace the outcome 
variable of the selection model with an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm has 
operations in a low institutional quality country, and 0 otherwise, LowInst_Ind.  
 Finally, we modify the instrumental variables in Li et al. (2011) to focus on operations in 
countries with low institutional quality. Specifically, we measure StateExportsLow as exports 
from the state in which the firm’s corporate headquarters are located to low institutional quality 
countries as a percentage of total U.S. exports. The benefit of experience transacting in countries 
with low institutional quality may have a particularly large benefit in the case of globalization 
into a country with low institutional quality given the higher risk of operations in these countries. 
We modify the industry-level instrumental variable in this analysis, IndPercLow, to be the 
percentage of firms, in our sample, in each one-digit SIC code which report at least one segment 
in a country with low institutional quality. We expect IndPercLow to be positively associated 
with the level of a firm’s operations in weak governance countries. We exclude the minority 
interest indicator variable from our selection model in this analysis, since we are not aware of 
theoretical or empirical evidence that acquisitions provide a more effective means of entry into 
either weak or strong governance countries.7  
 This leads to the following selection model: 
 
7 Our results are quantitatively and qualitatively unchanged if we include Min_Int in the selection model controlling 




LowInst_Ind = β0 + β1IndPercLow + β2StateExpLow + βi-jControls + βj-kIndustry + ε       (4)  
We then use the results of this regression to calculate the inverse Mills ratio, IMR, and 
estimate our outcome model, Eq. (3), including the IMR from Eq. 4, and using only the subset of 
firms in our sample that are MNCs. A positive association between LowInstGlob and the cost of 
debt (β1 in Eq. 3) would support our assertion that the cost of debt is positively associated with 
the level of operations in countries with low institutional quality. We again include the same 
controls variables included in Eq. (1) and 1-digit SIC code indicator variables in both the 
selection and outcome models, and evaluate statistical significance using robust standard errors 
clustered by firm.  
3.3.3. Controlling for the choice to operate in weak governance countries using matching 
techniques  
 
 Lastly, we address the potential endogeneity of the choice to operate in countries with 
low institutional quality using matched samples. The research design choices inherent in 
matching techniques involve trade-offs between the number of matches and the quality of the 
matching, and no single matching technique is clearly superior. Therefore, we perform our 
matching tests using four matched samples based on alternative matching techniques to ensure 
the robustness of our results. We use matching with replacement in all of our matching analyses 
in order to generate matched samples most similar to our treatment sample.  
 We first use three matching methods based on propensity score matching. In each of 
these tests we measure propensity scores for the likelihood MNCs operate in countries with low 
institutional quality based on the instrumental variables used in our Heckman selection model 
addressing the choice to operate in countries with low institutional quality, IndPercLow and 
StateExpLow, as well as all control variables included in Eq. (1). Based on the resulting 




neighbors, and Epanechnikov kernel matching. To generate our fourth matched sample, we use 
Mahalanobis distance matching based on the actual covariates (IndPercLow, StateExpLow, and 
all control variables included in Eq. 1) rather than the propensity scores. 
We then use each of these four matched samples to evaluate the effect of operations in 
countries with low institutional quality based on the differences between the cost of debt of 
MNCs that operate in countries with low institutional quality and the matched samples of MNCs 
that do not operate in countries with low institutional quality.8 A finding that MNCs with 
operations in countries with low institutional quality obtain higher interest rate spreads, on 
average, than MNCs that do not operate in countries with low institutional quality would provide 
additional evidence consistent with our assertions. One limitation of these tests is that firms who 
report operations in both low and high institutional quality countries will be classified as 
operating in countries with low institutional quality, which introduces noise to this analysis. 
Therefore, we also perform our propensity score matching analyses using the subsample of 
MNCs that only report a single foreign segment.  
4. Sample selection and summary statistics 
 We begin our sample with all loans in the Dealscan database for non-utility and non-
financial publicly traded U.S. firms with available financial information in Compustat from 
January 1999 to December 2017. We limit our sample to public U.S. companies for two reasons. 
First, this restriction makes our sample comparable to the sample used in Li et al. (2011). 
Second, limiting the sample to U.S. companies allows us to isolate the effect of operations in 
countries with low institutional quality from the effects of cross-country variations in 
 
8 In all of our matching analyses, we include only MNCs and in lieu of indicator variables in the scoring model, we 
require exact matches on loan type, loan purpose, and one-digit SIC code to control for loan type and purpose, and 




institutional quality, culture, and accounting transparency that previous literature has 
demonstrated to be associated with private lending terms (e.g., Qian and Strahan, 2007; Chui et 
al., 2016).  
We begin our sample in 1999 because required segment disclosures were altered 
significantly by ASC 280, which was effective for fiscal years beginning after December 1997. 
Beginning the sample in 1999 ensures that segment disclosures used in our study were generated 
under a common accounting standard and avoids issues that may have occurred during the initial 
implementation of the standard in 1998. Each loan deal, or package, in the Dealscan database can 
be comprised of one or more loan facilities and the priced and non-priced terms can vary across 
loan facilities in the same package. Due to this variance, we treat each loan facility as a separate 
observation in our sample.  
 We collect firm-level financial statement information from the Compustat North America 
database and collect segment financial information from the Compustat Historical Segment 
database. We measure all Compustat variables for the fiscal year prior to loan origination to 
ensure that the information is available prior to loan issuance. Following prior research, we 
require that the sum of the sales of reported segments be within one percent of total sales 
reported in the financial statements (Denis et al., 2002; Gande et al., 2009). This ensures that all 
segment sales are allocated geographically. Additionally, we restrict our sample to only firm 
years with sales in excess of $20 million to ensure that the results are not driven by small firms 
(Gande et al., 2009), and drop all observations missing necessary data for our analyses. Our final 
sample consists of 15,715 loan contracts for 2,982 U.S. public firms. Of these loan observations, 




The firms in our sample report operations in 89 countries. Forty-three countries appear in the 
sample for 10 or more years, with 11 countries appearing in every sample year.  
Table 1 reports the sample selection procedure and the distribution of loan observations 
in our sample by loan type. The most common loan types in our sample are revolving loans (58.1 
percent of the sample) and term loans (32.2 percent of the sample). This distribution is consistent 
with prior research (Kim et al. 2011). 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for each loan observation. The statistics reflect the 
fact that the majority of foreign segments are not reported at the country level. However, over 40 
percent of the segments reported are country specific, with a substantial number reported in 
countries with both high and low institutional quality.9 The mean number of total foreign 
segments and the mean total foreign sales ratio (the sum of the means for each type) are 
comparable to the mean for foreign segments and sales ratio reported in related studies (e.g., Li 
et al. 2011), though the mean total foreign assets ratio in our sample is lower than that found in 
previous studies.10   
 Table 3 displays the Pearson pairwise correlation matrix between LogSpread and the 
explanatory variables used in our analysis. We find that LogSpread is negatively associated with 
globalization in all three types of segments (i.e., low institutional quality, high institutional 
quality, and non-country specific). However, the correlation of LogSpread with globalization in 
low institutional quality countries is generally weaker than its association with globalization in 
high institutional quality countries and is substantially weaker than its association with non-
 
9 6,729 segments (29.0% of segments) are reported in countries with low institutional quality. Of these 2,339 are in 
countries with low economic development, 2,671 were in countries with weak property rights, and 6,422 are in 
countries with weak creditor rights. 
10 The lower levels of reported segment assets in our sample reflects the fact that under ASC 280 firms are required 




country specific globalization. In addition, LogSpread and our measures of globalization in 
countries with low institutional quality are both significantly correlated with several of our 
control variables indicating the importance of basing inferences on multivariate tests.11 The 
highest correlation between any two of our variables is 0.78, between the natural log of the loan 
amount and Size. To investigate the potential of multicollinearity resulting from this high 
correlation, we calculated variance inflation scores for our variables and found no variance 
inflation scores above 5.12 
[Insert Table 1,2,3 About Here] 
5. Results 
 We first examine the effect of an MNC’s operations in countries with low institutional 
quality on the price component of private debt using multivariate regression tests. We present the 
results of these tests in Table 4. In the first column of Table 4, we measure operations in low 
institutional quality countries using the number of operating segments. Consistent with our 
expectations we find that the estimated coefficient on LowInst is positively, and significantly, 
associated with interest rate spreads. In terms of economic significance, the coefficient on 
LowInst, 0.017, indicates that a one-standard deviation change in the number of segments 
reported in countries with low institutional quality (approximately one additional segment) is 
associated with a 1.94% increase in the spread on bank loans.13 In addition, we find significant 
 
11 For example, our proxies for globalization in countries with low institutional quality are positively correlated with 
Size, and LogSpread is negative correlated with Size. These cross-correlations could explain why globalization in 
countries with low institutional quality appears to be associated with lower interest rates based on only the univariate 
correlations. However, a multivariate analysis is required to disentangle the relationships among these variables.  
12 In untabulated analyses we performed our primary analysis excluding, in turn, either LogAmount or Size and 
obtained statistically similar results. 
13 As a point of reference, our results indicate that a one standard-deviation increase in LogMaturity has an effect of 




differences between the coefficient on LowInst and the coefficients on both HighInst and 
NonSpec supporting our argument that globalization is not homogenous.   
 In the second column of Table 4, we measure operations in countries with low 
institutional quality using MNC’s sales in these countries. We again find a positive and 
significant association between LowInst and interest rate spreads. In addition, the we find a 
negative and significant association between NonSpec and interest rate spreads. This result is 
consistent with the findings in Li et al. (2011) that overall globalization is associated with lower 
debt costs. Finally, we find that the difference between the coefficients on HighInst and NonSpec 
is significant. The third column of Table 4 presents our findings when we measure globalization 
using the level of assets reported in countries with low institutional quality. In this case, we do 
not find a significant association between operations in countries with low institutional quality 
and interest rate spreads. However, we do find a significant difference between the coefficient on 
LowInst and the coefficients on both HighInst and NonSpec.   
 In all three specifications, our findings with regards to the control variables are consistent 
with prior literature (e.g., Li et al. 2011; Bharath et al. 2011; Graham et al. 2008). Specifically, 
we find that larger, more profitable firms, with more tangible assets, and greater expected growth 
are able to obtain loans at lower costs. In contrast, greater leverage, a higher default risk, and a 
greater return volatility are associated with higher all-in-spreads, commensurate with these 
characteristics reflecting a higher level of risk to the lender. In addition, we find that secured 
loans have higher interest rates, consistent with lenders using higher all-in-spreads and collateral 
requirements as complementary means to address risk.14 
 
14 Our results are qualitatively and quantitatively unchanged if we include a control variable for the number of 
covenants included in the lending agreement, using Fama-French 48 industry indicator variables rather than 1-digit 




 Our multivariate regression results are generally consistent with our argument that U.S. 
MNCs’ operations in low institutional quality countries are associated with higher lending 
spreads. However, it is possible that unmeasurable factors related to corporate globalization 
decisions are also related to bank loan spreads. Therefore, we next present our results employing 
the Heckman (1979) two-step selection technique to control for firms’ choice to operate globally. 
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 5.  
 With regards to our selection models, we find that the choice to operate globally is 
positively and significantly associated with both IndPercGlobal and StateExp using all three 
measures of globalization, supporting the appropriateness of including these variables in the 
first-stage regressions.15 However, we do not find a significant association between Min_Int and 
the choice to operate globally.  
 The results of our outcome models are consistent with our multivariate regression results. 
Specifically, we find that the coefficient on LowInst is positive and statistically significant when 
we measure globalization using either the number of segments or the foreign sales ratio. In 
addition, the coefficient on HighInst is negative and significant when we measure globalization 
using the level of assets reported in strong governance countries, and the coefficient on NonSpec 
is negative and significant in the specifications measuring globalization using the sales and asset 
ratios. Similarly, we find that the differences between the coefficients on LowInst and HighInst 
are statistically significant when we measure globalization using either segment counts or foreign 
assets, and the difference between LowInst and NonSpec is significant in all three cases. We infer 
 
15 A joint F-test indicates that the instruments are relevant using all three measures of globalization. In addition, the 






from these results that the findings from our multivariate regression tests are not driven by an 
omitted correlated variable associated with firms’ choice to operate globally. 
[Insert Table 4 About Here] 
  Next, we investigate the extent to which unmeasurable variables related to MNCs’ 
choice to operate in countries with low institutional quality influence our results. We present the 
results of this analysis in Table 6. In the selection model, we find that IndPercLow is 
significantly, at the 1% level, associated with MNCs’ choice to operate in a country with low 
institutional quality. However, our other IV, StateExpLow obtains significance only when we 
measure globalization based on the number of reported segments.16 Similar to our multivariate 
regression analysis, we find a positive and significant association between LowInst and the cost 
of debt when we measure globalization using either the number of operating segments or the 
foreign sales ratio. In addition, we find that the difference between LowInst and HighInst is 
significant when we use the asset ratio as our measure of globalization. Finally, we find that non-
country-specific globalization is negatively and significantly associated with the costs of debt 
using all three of our measures of globalization as is the difference between NonSpec and 
LowInst.  
 Finally, we present our matched sample tests in Table 7. Panel A of Table 7 presents the 
results when we measure globalization using operating segments. We again find that the cost of 
debt is significantly higher for MNCs with operating segments in countries with low institutional 
quality than for the MNCs in the matched samples. This result holds for all of our matching 
 
16 Joint F-tests indicate that these instrumental variables are relevant using all three measures of globalization. 
However, the Kleibergen-Paap Test fails to obtain significance when we measure globalization using segment 
counts or the asset ratio, indicating that jointly the instruments are weak. Therefore, as a robustness test, we 
performed our analysis using only IndPercLow as an instrumental variable and obtained qualitatively and 
quantitively similar results in our main tests and a significant result in the Kleibergen-Paap test consistent with 




techniques and is stronger when we limit the sample to firms reporting exactly one foreign 
segment. We present the results when we measure globalization using the foreign sales ratio and 
foreign assets ratios in Panels B and C, respectively. In these cases, we do not find significant 
differences in the cost of debt between MNCs that operate in low institutional quality countries 
and the matched MNC samples when we include all global firms in the test. However, when we 
restrict the sample to MNCs that report exactly one foreign segment, we find that MNCs with 
operations in countries with low institutional quality have significantly higher costs of debt, 
consistent with our previous results. This may indicate that the continuous nature of the asset and 
sales ratios result in a greater likelihood of a misclassification error because this analysis does 
not control for non-country specific segments or segments reported in countries with high 
institutional quality. Specifically, MNCs that report multiple segments are classified as operating 
in a low institutional quality country even when the vast majority of their foreign assets or sales 
are in high institutional quality countries.   
[Insert Table 5 About Here] 
 Overall, our results support our argument that the effect of globalization on the costs of 
private debt is not homogenous. Our evidence concerning operations in non-country-specific 
segments generally supports prior evidence that globalization reduces lenders’ perception of the 
risk of the firm resulting in lower costs of debt (Li et al. 2011). However, the level of operations 
in countries with low institutional quality has the opposite effect and is associated with higher 
costs of debt.17 This finding supports the inference that the results found in the cross-country 
literature (e.g., Qian and Strahan, 2007) generalize to multinational corporations with operations 
 
17 To provide additional validation of our results, we also performed our tests using credit ratings as the dependent 
variable and found that the level of MNCs operations in countries with low institutional quality is associated with 




in countries with low institutional quality, and are not limited to firms domiciled in countries 
with low institutional quality. Our additional tests indicate that this association is not likely to be 
driven by unobservable firm characteristics that may be associated with both the choice to 
operate in low institutional quality countries and the firms’ cost of debt. 
Our findings present compelling evidence of an association between the cost of private 
debt and the institutional quality of countries in which MNCs operate. However, we cannot infer 
a causal relationship between these variables, because institutional quality is likely to be 
endogenously related to several non-institutional attributes of the countries in which an MNC 
operates, including culture (See Kirkman, et al., 2006 for a review of literature documenting 
relations between culture and a wide range of formal and informal institutions). As a result, our 
ability to isolate the effect of institutional quality on the cost of debt is limited. However, to 
provide evidence that our findings do not result from institutional quality serving as a proxy for 
culture, we performed our multivariate analysis including control variables measuring cultural 
characteristics of the countries in which MNCs operate.  
Specifically, we included the following culture variables from Hofstede Insights: Power 
Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, Masculinity, Individualism, Long-Term Orientation, and 
Indulgence. When we measure globalization using segment counts, we include simple averages 
of each culture measure for each of the segments reported by the MNC (we use the sample mean 
of each measure of culture for non-country-specific segments). We use a weighted average of 
each culture measure for each segment when we measure globalization using foreign sales or 
assets. The results of this analysis (untabulated) provide little evidence of a significant 
association between culture and the price of private debt. More importantly, our results with 




countries with low institutional quality are robust to including control variables for cultural 
attributes of the countries in which MNCs operate.  
[Insert Table 6 About Here] 
6. Firm globalization and the non-price components of private debt  
 We next investigate the effect of MNCs operations in countries with low institutional 
quality on the non-price components of private debt. Following Li et al. (2011), we investigate 
the extent to which loan maturity, loan security requirements, or the number of loan covenants 
included in the lending agreement is associated with globalization, and in particular, with 
operations in countries with low institutional quality. Shorter maturities provide banks with 
greater bargaining power and allows them to more frequently re-evaluate the borrower’s credit 
profile, providing creditors a means to reduce risk (Barclay & Smith, 1995; Brockman et al., 
2010). Similarly, loan collateral security reduces the downside risk of the lender and has been 
found to be positively associated with the risk level of the borrowing firm (Berger & Udell, 
1980; Bharath et al. 2011). Finally, loan covenants reduce the creditor’s risk by providing 
opportunities for the lender to intervene quickly in the event of a negative event (Dichev & 
Skinner, 2002; Chava and Roberts, 2008). 
 We perform this analysis using the full sample and controlling for firms’ choice to 
operate internationally using the Heckman (1979) selection model in Equ. (2).18 We measure 
loan security requirements using the indicator variable, Secured, that is equal to 1 if the loan is 
secured with collateral, and 0 otherwise. We measure loan maturity using LogMaturity, the 
natural log of the loan term in months. Finally, we measure the use of covenants in lending 
 
18 In untabulated analyses, we also performed this analysis using only MNCs and controlling for the choice to 




agreements using the count of the number of covenants included in the lending agreement, 
Covenants.  
[Insert Table 7 About Here] 
We use the same control variables used in our analysis related to the price component of 
debt, except we exclude either Secured or LogMaturity, when that variable is the dependent 
variable. We do not include Spread as a control variable because the non-price terms of 
syndicated loans are normally established based on negotiations between the lead bank and the 
borrower, with the all-in-spread determined subsequently as other banks are recruited to the 
syndicate (Bharath et al., 2011). We use an ordinary least squares regression model when 
LogMaturity is the dependent variable, a Poisson model when Covenants is the dependent 
variable, and a probit model when the indicator variable Secured is the dependent variable.  
Consistent with the findings in Li et al. (2011), we do not find a significant association 
between debt maturity and globalization, regardless of the countries in which the MNC operates, 
or the measure of globalization. In addition, we find no evidence of an association between the 
number of covenants included in the lending agreement and globalization. We infer from these 
result that private lenders do not view loan maturities or covenants as efficient mechanisms to 
address the increased credit risk associated with operations in countries with low institutional 
quality.  
In contrast, the results of our analysis of the association between loan security 
requirements and globalization, shown in Table 8, reveal a subtle relationship between 
globalization and the use of collateral in private debt contracts. Specifically, we find no evidence 
of a significant association between the use of collateral and firms’ operations in strong 




firms’ operations in weak governance countries we find that our results depend on the nature of 
firms’ operations in those countries. We find no evidence that the use of collateral is associated 
with the number of segments in weak governance countries, and only a weak association 
between Secured and the level of sales in weak governance countries or in non-country-specific 
segments. However, we find significant evidence that the use of collateral is negatively 
associated with the level of assets located in countries with low institutional quality and in non-
country-specific segments. Our results with regards to non-country-specific segments are 
consistent with Li et al.’s (2011) inference that loans to globally diversified firms are less likely 
to be secured because banks perceive globalization as reducing firm risk. However, our findings 
with regard to assets in countries with low institutional quality supports the inference that the 
lower likelihood of loans including security requirements is at least partially driven by firms with 
larger levels of assets in weak governance countries which are likely to represent less valuable 
collateral.  
This finding also provides insight into the mechanism by which operations in countries 
with low institutional quality are associated with higher lending spreads. Specifically, collateral 
provides lenders with an alternative mechanism for addressing lending risk (Booth and Booth, 
2006). However, the ability of the lender to seize collateral depends on the institutional quality of 
the country (e.g., creditor rights) (Qian and Strahan, 2007). Therefore, the higher interest rate 
spreads associated with private loans to MNCs with greater assets in countries with low 
institutional quality are at least partially driven by recoverability concerns rather than default risk 
alone. 
[Insert Table 8 About Here] 




 Our results to this point are consistent with private lenders assessing that U.S. MNCs 
with greater operations in countries with low institutional quality have greater credit risk and less 
valuable collateral. We expect rational managers would be aware of this and make strategic 
decisions to limit the increased costs of debt resulting from banks’ higher assessments of the 
firms’ credit risk. Specifically, ASC 280 provides management with significant flexibility in the 
reporting of geographic segments. The standard requires disclosures of revenues from external 
customers and long-lived assets in individual foreign countries only if those sales or long-lived 
assets are “material”, but does not define materiality. In addition, the standard allows an 
exception if “providing the geographical information is impracticable” (ASC 280-10-50-41).19 
Therefore, managers may reduce the level of disclosures related to operations in countries with 
low institutional quality in the years around a private debt issuance in order to reduce the 
salience of those operations to private lenders. 
It is not clear that strategic segment disclosures provide a benefit to the firm in the private 
lending arena. On one hand, private lenders have access to, and are better able to process, firm-
specific information than other market participants (Bharath et al. 2008).20 On the other hand, in 
spite of this information advantage, recent studies provide evidence that public disclosures have 
implications for private lending. For example, Ertugrul et al. (2017) present evidence that firms 
with longer 10-K filings that include more ambiguous words obtain higher interest rate spreads 
and more restrictive debt covenants. Similarly, Kim et al. (2011) provide within-firm evidence 
that the disclosure of internal control weaknesses under section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is 
 
19 In addition, ASC 280 provides firms with significant flexibility in the allocation of revenues to specific countries, 
and in determining what classifies as a long-lived asset (ASC 280-10-55-22 and ASC 280-10-55-23).  
20 In addition, failing to disclose a segment in a country with low institutional quality for only a small number of 
years around the loan offering may not be sufficient to conceal it from the lender, and could even work against the 




associated with higher interest rate spreads on private debt.  Therefore, the extent to which 
managers use the flexibility inherent in ASC 280 to strategically report segment information 
around private debt offerings is an empirical question.21  
We test this question by estimating the following regression using the sample of firm-
years for all multinational corporations (i.e., firms that report at least one foreign segment) with 
the necessary data available on Compustat and CRSP for the years 1999 – 2017.   
LowInstGlob = β0 + β1Loan + β2IndPercLow + β3StateExpLow + β4-iControls +   (5) 
βj-kIndustry 
LowInstGlob represents our measures of globalization in countries with low institutional 
quality based on the number of segments reported in countries with low institutional quality, and 
the sales and asset ratios. Loan is an indicator variable that takes the value of one in the three 
years around a private loan issuance, and zero otherwise.22 A negative coefficient for β1 would 
be consistent with management at MNCs reducing disclosures related to operations in countries 
with low institutional quality around private debt issuances.  
We control explicitly for the likelihood of firms having operations in countries with low 
institutional quality using IndPercLow and StateExpLow. We also include all of the other control 
variables included in our primary analysis as well as industry indicator variables, and measure 
significance using robust standard errors clustered by firm. The results of this analysis are 
presented in Table 9.  
 
21 Based on the contrasting arguments related to the extent that public disclosures provide information that is useful 
to private lenders, we refrain from drawing generalized inferences regarding firms’ disclosure choices around 
private loan issuances from this analysis. Rather, we intend this analysis to provide additional support for our 
primary analyses and inferences regarding the association between MNCs operations in countries with low 
institutional quality and the costs of private debt. 
22 We include the year before and year after loan issuance because a change in segment reporting that occurs only in 




We find that the coefficient on Loan is negative and significant when we measure 
globalization in countries with weak legal institutions using either the number of segments 
reported, or the sales ratio. The coefficient on Loan is also negative when we measure 
globalization using the assets ratio; however, the coefficient fails to obtain statistical significance 
in this case (p = 0.130). These results are consistent with rational managers using the discretion 
in ASC 280 to reduce disclosures related to operations in weak institutional quality countries in 
the years around private debt issuances and provide further support for our argument that 
operations in these countries are associated with less favorable debt terms.23 
8. Conclusion 
 Using a sample of 15,715 private loan contracts covering the years 1999 – 2017, we 
investigate the effect of operations in countries with low institutional quality on the terms of 
private debt contracts of U.S. MNCs. Consistent with prior literature, we find evidence that a 
firm’s level of globalization reported in non-country-specific segments is associated with a lower 
cost of debt (Reeb et al., 2001; Mansi and Reeb, 2002; Li et al., 2011). However, in contrast to 
prior literature, we find the price component of private debt is positively associated with the level 
of an MNC’s operations in countries with low institutional quality, indicative of lenders viewing 
such operations as increasing the risk of the firm. Our results contribute to the literature, by 
providing evidence that globalization is not a homogenous construct, and that the choice of 
countries in which an MNC operates should be considered when evaluating the effect of 
globalization on private lending terms, and on firm value in general. 
 
23 In untabulated tests, we found no significant association between the level of operations reported in countries with 
high institutional quality and the issuance of private debt. Therefore, our results do not reflect a general decrease in 




 In addition, our results extend cross-country research investigating the effect of country 
level creditor rights and enforcement mechanisms on the terms of public and private debt for 
domestic companies (Qian and Strahan, 2007; Bae and Goyal, 2009; Persakis and Iatridis, 2017). 
Our finding that the price component of private debt is positively associated with the level of an 
MNC’s operations in countries with low institutional quality is consistent with the findings in 
these papers, indicating that operations in countries with low institutional quality have a 
significant impact on the cost of private debt even holding constant the firm’s country of 
domicile. Moreover, our findings with regards to debt collateralization are also consist with the 
findings in Qian and Strahan (2007), and indicate that the negative association between 
collateralization and globalization documented by Li et al. (2011) is at least partially driven by 
the weaker property laws covering assets held in countries with low institutional quality. Finally, 
consistent with managers at MNCs being aware of the negative effect of operations in countries 
with low institutional quality on the terms of private debt contracts, we find that MNCs report 
fewer segments in countries with low institutional quality in the years around private debt 
issuances. Collectively, we infer from our results that creditors view higher levels of operations 
in countries with low institutional quality as being associated with greater lending risk. However, 
lenders adapt the non-price terms of private loans in a manner that reflects both the legal 
environments in which a firm operates and the nature of its operations in those environments.    
 Our findings provide a basis for several future studies. First, we do not consider the 
potential benefits to the MNC of operating in countries with low institutional quality, such as: 
lower labor costs, access to raw materials, or greater opportunities for value creation. Future 
research investigating the extent to which these factors generate value for MNCs operating in 




fruitful. Second, our robustness tests provide evidence that our results are not an artifact of the 
relation between institutional quality and culture. However, future research fully disentangling 
the effects of institutional quality and culture on private debt contracting would make a 
significant contribution to the literature. Finally, when issuing private debt, companies have the 
choice as to where to originate the debt. Prior evidence indicates that domestic lending may lead 
to lower spreads due to improved monitoring and due diligence (Bharath et al. 2011; Brown, 
2016). The restriction of our sample to only U.S. based MNCs should reduce concerns that our 
results are affected by variations in monitoring. However, future research investigating the extent 
to which our findings are moderated by the inclusion of a local bank in the lending syndicate 
could provide valuable insights.  
[Insert Table 9 about Here] 
We acknowledge that our study is not without limitations. While ASC 280 has increased 
the granularity of segment disclosures and allows researchers to view information regarding the 
operations of a firm at a country level when operations in a single country are substantial enough 
to be considered “material,” there is still a large portion of globalization that cannot be 
disaggregated due to lack of disclosure. The inability to fully disaggregate globalization 
increases the risk of measurement error in our tests.24 An additional limitation of segment 
reporting data under ASC 280 is the presence of firm discretion regarding what segment level 
information to report. Some firms disclose foreign sales, but not foreign assets, or vice versa, at a 
country level. So, while we may be able to identify a segment as operating in a specific country, 
 
24 Non-country-specific segments could also introduce bias in our analyses. However, bias could only explain our 
results if MNCs with higher credit risk are more likely to choose to disclose operations in countries with low 
institutional quality, but are not more likely to choose to disclose operations in countries with high institutional 
quality. As an additional robustness test, we performed our analysis excluding MNC observations that disclose only 




we cannot always measure the segment’s sales or assets. Similarly, data regarding private bank 
loans are limited. Our sample utilizes the Dealscan database for loan characteristics, a database 
that is skewed towards large firms obtaining loans from large banks. This limits our ability to 
generalize to smaller multinational firms.  
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Table 1 Sample selection and distribution by firm and loan type 
 
Panel A: Sample selection 
  Firms  Loans 
Loans in DealScan matched to firms in Compustat from 1999 - 2017  6,291  41,855 
Less:     
     Observations with sum of segment sales not within +/- 1% of total sales  (255)  (6,358) 
     Loans to utilities or financial firms  (958)  (8,154) 
     Observations with total sales less than $20 million  (368)  (952) 
     Observations missing necessary control variables  (1,728)  (10,676) 
Total Observations  2,982  15,715 
     
 
Panel B: Number of loans by firm and loan type 
Firm Type  364 – Day Facilities  Term Loans  Revolving Loans  Other Loan Types  Total Loans 
MNC  950  2,761  4,873  84  8,668 
Domestic  409  2,305  4,255  78  7,047 
Total  1,359  5,066  9,128  162  15,715 
Firms are labeled as an MNC for each year that they report at least one geographic segment as existing outside the United States otherwise the firm 







Table 2 Summary statistics 
 
 Mean SD Median Q1 Q3 
LogSpread 5.12 0.76 5.22 4.83 5.62 
LowInstSeg 0.43 1.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 
LowInstSales 0.03 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 
LowInstAssets 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 
HighInstSeg 0.19 0.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 
HighInstSales 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 
HighInstAssets 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 
NonSpecSeg 0.85 1.11 0.00 0.00 1.00 
NonSpecSales 0.09 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.12 
NonSpecAssets 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Size  7.27 1.75 7.28 6.07 8.44 
Profitability 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.09 0.17 
Leverage 0.29 0.22 0.26 0.13 0.40 
Tangibility 0.32 0.25 0.25 0.12 0.47 
Market-to-Book 1.73 1.11 1.44 1.14 1.94 
EDF 0.14 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.16 
ReturnVolatility 0.13 0.07 0.11 0.08 0.15 
DefSpread 1.02 0.35 0.92 0.81 1.18 
TermSpread 1.42 0.92 1.57 0.56 2.18 
TechBubble 0.14 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 
FinCrisis 0.07 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 
LogAmount 5.15 1.58 5.30 4.25 6.21 
LogMaturity 3.75 0.63 4.10 3.58 4.09 
Secured 0.53 0.50 1.00 0.00 1.00 
LogSynSize 1.74 0.95 1.79 1.10 2.40 
This table reports descriptive statistics for the 15,715 firm-loan observations in our sample. LogSpread is 
the natural log of the all-in-spread. LowInstSeg is the count of segments reported by the firm located in 
countries with low institutional quality. LowInstSales is the firm’s sales in countries with low institutional 
quality divided by total sales. LowInstAssets is the firm’s assets in countries with low institutional quality 
divided by total assets. HighInstSeg is the count of segments reported by the firm located in countries 
with high institutional quality. HighInstSales is the firm’s sales in countries with high institutional quality 
divided by total sales. HighInstAssets is the firm’s assets in countries with high institutional quality 
divided by total assets. NonSpecSeg is the count of segments reported by the firm that are reported at a 
regional or continent level. NonSpecSales is the firm’s sales in segments reported at a regional or 
continent level divided by total sales. NonSpecAssets is the firm’s assets in segments reported at the 
regional or continent level divided by total assets. Size is the natural log of the firm’s total assets in 
millions of U.S. dollars. Profitability is the ratio of operating income before depreciation to total assets. 
Leverage is the ratio of long term debt to total assets. Tangibility is the ratio of net property, plant, and 
equipment to total assets. Market-to-Book is the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of 
assets. EDF is the expected default frequency, measured as in Bharath & Shumway (2008). 
ReturnVolatility is the standard deviation of the monthly stock returns for the four years prior to loan 
inception. DefSpread is the difference between the yield on AAA bonds and BAA bonds measured in the 
month of loan origination.  




Table 2 – continued from prior page 
TermSpread is the difference between the yield on ten-year U.S. treasury bonds and two-year U.S. 
treasury bonds measured in the month of loan origination. TechBubble is an indicator variable taking the 
value of 1 if the loan was originated in 1999 or 2000, and 0 otherwise. FinCrisis is an indicator variable 
taking the value of 1 if the loan was originated in 2007 or 2008, and 0 otherwise. LogAmount is the 
natural log of the amount of the loan facility in millions of U.S. dollars. LogMaturity is the natural log of 
the length of the loan in months. Secured is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the loan is 
secured with collateral, and 0 otherwise. LogSynSize is the natural log of the number of lenders 




Table 3 Pearson correlation matrix for all-in-spread, globalization proxies and control variables 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
LogSpread (1) 1.00              
LowInstSeg (2) -0.03 1.00             
LowInstSales (3) 0.01 0.56 1.00            
LowInstAssets (4) -0.04 0.03 0.03 1.00           
HighInstSeg (5) -0.05 0.59 0.23 0.01 1.00          
HighInstSales (6) -0.00 0.18 0.10 0.00 0.42 1.00         
HighInstAssets (7) -0.06 0.13 0.05 0.01 0.33 0.27 1.00        
NonSpecSeg (8) -0.15 0.29 0.16 0.00 0.23 0.11 0.07 1.00       
NonSpecSales (9) -0.20 0.11 0.05 -0.00 0.11 0.06 0.06 0.70 1.00      
NonSpecAssets (10) -0.15 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.23 0.33 1.00     
Size (11) -0.40 0.11 -0.00 -0.01 0.10 0.02 0.05 0.20 0.16 0.12 1.00    
Profitability (12) -0.27 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.18 1.00   
Leverage (13) 0.23 -0.03 -0.07 -0.00 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 -0.08 -0.08 0.00 0.15 -0.00 1.00  
Tangibility (14) 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.05 -0.01 0.01 -0.15 -0.14 0.00 0.18 0.14 0.21 1.00 
Market-to-Book (15) -0.23 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.04 -0.09 0.00 -0.02 
EDF (16) 0.33 -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.08 -0.06 -0.05 -0.19 -0.29 0.19 0.04 
ReturnVolatility (17) 0.36 0.05 0.10 -0.00 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.09 0.09 -0.01 -0.43 -0.28 -0.05 -0.09 
DefSpread (18) 0.13 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.05 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 
TermSpread (19) 0.20 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.12 -0.02 0.00 0.00 
TechBubble (20) -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.00 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.09 -0.02 0.01 0.01 
FinCrisis (21) 0.06 0.01 0.02 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 
LogAmount(22) -0.37 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.78 0.17 0.14 0.08 
LogMaturity (23) 0.19 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.00 -0.03 -0.09 -0.05 -0.01 0.06 0.15 0.01 
Secured (24) 0.48 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 0.01 -0.02 -0.11 -0.14 -0.12 -0.38 -0.15 0.11 -0.03 
LogSynSize (25) -0.33 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.56 0.16 0.10 0.05 
 




Table 3 – continued from prior page 
 
Variable (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) 
Market-to-Book (15) 1.00           
EDF (16) -0.21 1.00          
ReturnVolatility (17) 0.10 0.34 1.00         
DefSpread (18) -0.05 0.08 -0.04 1.00        
TermSpread (19) -0.07 0.04 0.03 0.24 1.00       
TechBubble (20) 0.00 0.11 0.11 -0.25 -0.43 1.00      
FinCrisis (21) -0.00 0.03 -0.14 0.51 0.10 -0.16 1.00     
LogAmount(22) 0.08 -0.23 -0.41 0.01 0.08 -0.16 -0.02 1.00    
LogMaturity (23) -0.02 -0.10 -0.04 -0.08 -0.00 -0.17 -0.06 0.10 1.00   
Secured (24) 
 
-0.11 0.19 0.30 0.02 -0.00 -0.02 0.03 -0.28 0.16 1.00  
LogSynSize (25) 0.05 -0.22 -0.34 -0.00 0.08 -0.13 -0.05 0.63 0.15 -0.20 1.00 





Table 4 MNC’s operations countries with low institutional quality and private loan spreads: OLS results 
 
 Globalization Measure 
Segments Sales Assets 
LowInst 0.017** (2.51) 0.157** (2.14) 0.240 (1.28) 
HighInst -0.022 (-1.50) 0.088 (0.84) -0.741** (-3.03) 
NonSpec -0.008 (-1.09) -0.199*** (-3.98) -0.502*** (-2.65) 
Size -0.062*** (-8.23) -0.060*** (-8.25) -0.062*** (-8.41) 
Profitability -0.700*** (-7.76) -0.696*** (-7.74) -0.695*** (-7.75) 
Leverage 0.542*** (16.01) 0.538*** (15.92) 0.541*** (16.09) 
Tangibility -0.080** (-2.40) -0.086** (-2.62) -0.075** (-2.28) 
Market-to-Book -0.063*** (-5.82) -0.063*** (-5.84) -0.063*** (-5.87) 
EDF 0.311*** (13.03) 0.312*** (13.04) 0.312*** (13.10) 
ReturnVolatility 0.940*** (8.99) 0.969*** (9.18) 0.944*** (9.11) 
DefSpread 0.205*** (12.40) 0.203*** (12.28) 0.205*** (12.50) 
TermSpread 0.172*** (26.57) 0.172*** (26.48) 0.171*** (26.27) 
TechBubble 0.138*** (6.89) 0.138*** (6.87) 0.134*** (6.67) 
FinCrisis -0.014 (-0.59) -0.003 (-0.17) -0.012 (-0.52) 
LogAmount -0.042*** (-7.24) -0.042*** (-7.25) -0.041*** (-7.13) 
LogMaturity 0.036*** (2.73) 0.035*** (2.68) 0.035*** (2.67) 
Secured 0.301*** (23.17) 0.298*** (23.00) 0.300*** (23.09) 
LogSynSize -0.045*** (-5.28) -0.045*** (-5.27) -0.045*** (-5.29) 
Constant 4.706*** (45.02) 4.721*** (43.31) 4.753*** (44.81) 
    
LowInst – HighInst 0.039** (F = 4.09) 0.069 (F = 0.24) 0.981*** (F = 8.88) 
LowInst – NonSpec 0.025** (F = 5.41) 0.356*** (F = 15.52) 0.742*** (F = 7.24) 
N 15,715 15,715 15,715 
Adj. R2 0.612 0.614 0.613 
 
 








Table 4 – continued from prior page 
This table presents tests of association between the price component of private debt and firms’ level of 
globalization in low institutional quality countries, high institutional quality countries, and in non-country 
specific segments measured using number of segments, sales, and assets. All regressions include indicator 
variables for the loan purpose, loan type, and one-digit SIC code indicator variables. All variables are as 
defined in Table 2. T-statistics are shown parenthetically following the coefficients. Significance is 
measured using 2-tailed tests with robust standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, and * denote 





Table 5 MNC’s operations in countries with low institutional quality and private loan spreads: Heckman selection model results.  
 
 Globalization Measure 
Number of Segments Sales Ratio Assets Ratio 
Selection Model Outcome Model Selection Model Outcome Model Selection Model Outcome Model 
LowInst  0.01** (2.15)  0.14* (1.97)  0.30 (1.64) 
HighInst  -0.01 (-1.41)  0.07 (0.74)  -0.70*** (-3.14) 
NonSpec  -0.01 (-0.61)  -0.16*** (-3.28)  -0.36** (-2.25) 
IndPercGlobal 0.97*** (2.89)  0.89*** (2.64)  0.94*** (2.81)  
StateExp 1.18*** (2.70)  1.19*** (2.72)  1.16*** (2.67)  
Min_Int 0.02 (0.29)  0.02 (0.34)  0.02 (0.39)  
Size 0.23*** (11.41) -0.12*** (-10.63) 0.23*** (11.40) -0.11*** (-10.72) 0.23*** (11.39) -0.12*** (-10.80) 
Profitability 0.47** (1.98) -1.11*** (-7.46) 0.47** (1.97) -1.10*** (-7.43) 0.47** (1.97) -1.10*** (-7.39) 
Leverage -0.86*** (-6.13) 0.82*** (12.28) -0.85*** (-6.12) 0.82*** (12.35) -0.86*** (-6.13) 0.82*** (12.35) 
Tangibility -1.06*** (-7.30) 0.14** (2.04) -1.06*** (-7.33) 0.13* (1.95) -1.06*** (-7.32) 0.15** (2.21) 
Market-to-Book 0.07*** (2.91) -0.07*** (-7.07) 0.07*** (2.90) -0.07*** (-7.07) 0.07*** (2.90) -0.07*** (-7.09) 
EDF 0.21** (2.44) 0.27*** (6.69) 0.20** (2.44) 0.27*** (6.75) 0.20** (2.44) 0.27*** (6.73) 
ReturnVolatility 0.34 (0.87) 1.07*** (5.86) 0.33 (0.85) 1.11*** (5.97) 0.33 (0.85) 1.07*** (5.88) 
DefSpread -0.02 (-0.52) 0.21*** (8.31) -0.02 (-0.48) 0.21*** (8.21) -0.02 (-0.51) 0.21*** (8.42) 
TermSpread -0.02 (-1.05) 0.18*** (18.49) -0.02 (-0.94) 0.18*** (18.37) -0.02 (-0.98) 0.18*** (18.21) 
TechBubble 0.22*** (3.70) 0.12*** (3.66) 0.21*** (3.66) 0.12*** (3.69) 0.22*** (3.72) 0.12*** (3.53) 
FinCrisis -0.01 (-0.09) 0.04 (0.94) -0.01 (-0.11) 0.05 (1.31) -0.01 (-0.08) 0.04 (1.01) 
LogAmount  -0.04*** (-5.55)  -0.04*** (-5.54)  -0.04*** (-5.47) 
LogMaturity  0.01 (0.65)  0.01 (0.64)  0.01 (0.55) 
 





Table 5 continued from previous page 
Secured  0.31*** (17.25)  0.30*** (17.20)  0.30*** (17.31) 
LogSynSize  -0.05*** (-4.95)  -0.05*** (-4.94)  -0.05*** (-4.94) 
IMR  -0.47*** (-22.82)  -0.47*** (-22.62)  -0.47*** (-22.55) 
Constant -1.56*** (-3.68) 5.28*** (30.35) -1.52*** (-3.57) 5.29*** (29.93) -1.54*** (-3.64) 5.34*** (32.18) 
       
ρ   -0.80  -0.80  -0.80 
Wald test for ρ = 0 (p-value) p = 0.000  p = 0.000  p = 0.000 
LowInst – HighInst 0.02*  
(χ2 = 3.35) 
 0.07 
(χ2 = 0.29) 
 1.00*** 
(χ2 = 10.32) 
LowInst - NonSpec 0.02* 
(χ2 = 2.96) 
 0.30*** 
(χ2 = 13.00) 
 0.66*** 
(χ2 = 7.15) 
This table presents tests of association between the price component of private debt and the firm’s level of globalization in low institutional quality 
countries, high institutional quality countries, and in non-country specific segments measured using number of segments, sales, and assets. The 
tests are performed using the full sample (N = 15,715) and controlling for the firm’s choice to globalize using the Heckman procedure. The 
dependent variable in the first stage regression is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the firm reports a foreign segment, and 0 otherwise. 
The exogenous selection instruments adopted from Li et al. (2011) are: IndPercGlob, the percentage of firms in the same two-digit SIC code that 
are global; StateExp, the ratio of exports from the firm’s home state in year t to total US exports in year t; and Min_Int, an indicator variable that 
takes the value of 1 if the firm reports a minority interest, and 0 otherwise. All other variables are as defined in Table 2. All regressions include 
one-digit SIC code indicator variables. Z-statistics are shown parenthetically following the coefficients. Significance is measured using 2-tailed 





Table 6 MNC’s operations in countries with low institutional quality and private loan spreads: Heckman selection model for selection to operate 
in a country with low institutional quality   
 
 Globalization Measure 
Number of Segments Sales Ratio Assets Ratio 
Selection Model Outcome Model Selection Model Outcome Model Selection Model Outcome Model 
LowInst  0.01* (1.85)  0.17** (1.98)  0.25 (1.27) 
HighInst  -0.02 (-1.15)  0.09 (0.62)  -0.53* (-1.95) 
NonSpec  -0.02*(-2.03)  -0.32*** (-4.02)  -0.82*** (-3.23) 
IndPercLow 3.73*** (6.90)  3.59*** (6.57)  3.69*** (6.75)  
StateExpLow 1.06* (1.67)  1.02 (1.57)  1.05 (1.65)  
Size -0.03 (-1.07) -0.05*** (-2.98) -0.03 (-1.08) -0.05*** (-3.18) -0.03 (-1.09) -0.05*** (-3.18) 
Profitability -0.09 (-0.25) -0.78*** (-3.27) -0.10 (-0.28) -0.74*** (-3.10) -0.09 (-0.26) -0.75*** (-3.13) 
Leverage -0.25 (-1.35) 0.64*** (6.17) -0.25 (-1.33) 0.67*** (6.72) -0.24 (-1.32) 0.65*** (6.22) 
Tangibility 0.87*** (4.00) -0.52*** (-4.57) 0.86*** (3.95) -0.53*** (-4.69) 0.87*** (3.98) -0.49*** (-4.20) 
Market-to-Book -0.03 (-1.27) -0.07*** (-3.56) -0.03 (-1.27) -0.08*** (-3.74) -0.03 (-1.29) -0.07*** (-3.57) 
EDF 0.05 (0.46) 0.34*** (5.11) 0.05 (0.45) 0.34*** (5.16) 0.05 (0.43) 0.34*** (5.18) 
ReturnVolatility -0.22 (-0.41) 1.06*** (3.31) -0.23 (-0.43) 1.12*** (3.45) -0.23 (-0.42) 1.07*** (3.32) 
DefSpread 0.06 (1.03) 0.14*** (3.51) 0.06 (1.05) 0.13*** (3.41) 0.06 (1.04) 0.14*** (3.53) 
TermSpread -0.03 (-1.03) 0.17*** (10.27) -0.02 (-0.88) 0.17*** (10.43) -0.02 (-0.96) 0.16*** (10.17) 
TechBubble -0.20** (-2.54) 0.35*** (6.49) -0.21*** (-2.67) 0.34*** (6.47) -0.20** (-2.54) 0.35*** (6.50) 
FinCrisis -0.21** (-2.39) 0.17*** (2.69) -0.21** (-2.37) 0.19*** (2.99) -0.21** (-2.36) 0.18*** (2.80) 
LogAmount  -0.05*** (-4.48)  -0.05*** (-4.40)  -0.05*** (-4.48) 
LogMaturity  -0.01 (-0.40)  -0.01 (-0.29)  -0.01 (-0.42) 
 





Table 6 – continued from previous page 
Secured  0.28*** (11.50)  0.27*** (11.12)  0.28*** (11.46) 
LogSynSize  -0.06*** (-3.39)  -0.05*** (-3.22)  -0.06*** (-3.43) 
IMR  -0.55*** (-14.77)  -0.54*** (-14.11)  -0.55*** (-14.38)  
Constant -0.06 (-0.13) 4.97*** (23.02) 0.03 (0.07) 4.99*** (23.01) 0.04 (0.09) 5.04*** (23.43) 
       
ρ   -0.85  -0.84  -0.84 
Wald test for ρ = 0 (p-value) p = 0.000  p = 0.000  p = 0.000 
LowInst – HighInst 0.03 
(χ2 = 2.38) 
 0.08 
(χ2 = 0.23) 
 0.78** 
(χ2 = 4.64)  
LowInst - NonSpec 0.03*** 
(χ2 = 6.70) 
 0.49*** 
(χ2 = 17.70) 
 1.07*** 
(χ2 = 10.66) 
This table presents tests of association between the price component of private debt and the firm’s level of globalization in low institutional quality 
countries, high institutional quality countries, and in non-country specific segments measured using number of segments, sales, and assets. The 
tests are performed using only multinational firms (N=8,668) and controlling for the firm’s choice to operate in a low institutional quality country 
using the Heckman procedure. The dependent variable in the first stage regression is an indicator variable for firms that report operations in a 
country with low institutional quality. The exogenous selection instruments are: IndPercLow, the percentage of firms in the same two-digit SIC 
code that report operations in a low institutional quality country; and StateExpLow, the ratio of exports from the firm’s home state to low 
institutional quality countries in year t to total US exports in year t. All other variables are as defined in Table 2. All regressions include one-digit 
SIC code indicator variables. Z-statistics are shown parenthetically following the coefficients. Significance is measured using 2-tailed tests with 




Table 7 MNC’s operations in countries with low institutional quality and private loan spreads: Matched 
sample estimation 
 
Panel A Presence of a foreign segment in a low institutional quality country as treatment variable 
 
Matching Method All MNC Firms Firms with exactly one 
Foreign Segment 
PSM - Nearest Neighbor (n = 10) 0.06*** (3.41) 0.12** (2.44) 
PSM - Nearest Neighbor (n = 50) 0.07** (2.56) 0.07* (1.72) 
PSM - Epanechnikov kernel 0.05*** (2.70) 0.10*** (3.54) 
Mahalanobis distance 0.06*** (3.49) 0.13*** (4.18) 
 
Panel B Presence of foreign sales reported in a low institutional quality country as treatment variable 
     
Matching Method All MNC Firms Firms with exactly one 
Foreign Segment 
PSM - Nearest Neighbor (n = 10) -0.00 (-0.04) 0.11*** (2.68) 
PSM - Nearest Neighbor (n = 50) 0.02 (0.95) 0.07** (2.09) 
PSM - Epanechnikov kernel -0.00 (-0.01) 0.08*** (3.18) 
Mahalanobis distance -0.00 (-0.03) 0.13*** (3.95) 
 
Panel C Presence of foreign assets reported in a low institutional quality country as treatment variable 
     
Matching Method All MNC Firms Firms with exactly one 
Foreign Segment 
PSM - Nearest Neighbor (n = 10) 0.01 (0.73) 0.12*** (2.88) 
PSM - Nearest Neighbor (n = 50) 0.02 (1.28) 0.07* (1.76) 
PSM - Epanechnikov kernel 0.00 (0.57) 0.10*** (2.90) 
Mahalanobis distance 0.00 (0.23) 0.13*** (5.35) 
 
This table presents the difference in LogSpread between firms with segments in low institutional quality 
countries and matched samples of multinational firms without operations in low institutional quality 
countries. We generate matched samples first using propensity scores based on the identification variables 
used in our Heckman model (IndPercLow and StateExpLow) and all control variables included in our 
multivariate regression analyses (Equation 1): retaining the ten nearest neighbors, retaining the fifty 
nearest neighbors, and using Epanechnikov kernel matches. Then, we generate our fourth set of matched 
firms using Mahalanobis distance matching based on the actual covariates rather than the propensity 
scores. For all matching methods we require an exact match on loan purpose, loan type, and one-digit SIC 
code to control for loan-type and industry specific effects. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 





Table 8 MNC’s operations in countries with low institutional quality and loan security requirements: Heckman selection model results.  
 
 Globalization Measure 
Number of Segments Sales Ratio Assets Ratio 
Selection Model Outcome Model Selection Model Outcome Model Selection Model Outcome Model 
LowInst  -0.01 (0.46)  -0.36* (-1.69)  -1.36** (-2.54) 
HighInst  -0.01 (-0.16)  0.05 (0.14)  0.63 (0.81) 
NonSpec  0.00 (0.10)  -0.51*** (-4.01)  -1.29*** (-2.83) 
IndPercGlob 0.23 (0.52)  0.18 (0.41)  0.20 (0.46)  
StateExp 1.56*** (2.95)  1.58*** (3.03)  1.57*** (2.97)  
Min_Int 0.06 (0.82)  0.06 (0.86)  0.06 (0.90)  
Size 0.22*** (10.39) -0.29*** (-11.49) 0.22*** (10.36) -0.28*** (-11.11) 0.22*** (10.36) -0.29*** (-11.36) 
Profitability 0.41* (1.65) -1.97*** (-4.34) 0.40 (1.65) -1.99*** (-4.43) 0.40 (1.65) -1.98*** (-4.41) 
Leverage -0.76*** (-5.24) 1.20*** (8.62) -0.75*** (-5.23) 1.15*** (8.44) -0.76*** (-5.23) 1.19*** (8.55) 
Tangibility -1.15*** (-7.66) 0.35 (1.43) -1.15*** (-7.66) 0.35 (1.44) -1.15*** (-7.67) 0.42 (1.79) 
Market-to-Book 0.06** (2.39) -0.08*** (-3.01) 0.06** (2.40) -0.08*** (-2.88) 0.06** (2.40) -0.08*** (-3.07) 
EDF 0.19** (2.21) 0.21* (1.72) 0.19** (2.21) 0.21* (1.71) 0.19** (2.21) 0.21* (1.76) 
ReturnVolatility 0.12 (0.29) 2.89*** (4.32) 0.11 (0.27) 3.09*** (4.52) 0.11 (0.28) 2.83*** (4.23) 
DefSpread 0.01 (0.30) 0.11* (1.71) 0.01 (0.30) 0.10 (1.57) 0.01 (0.31) 0.11* (1.66) 
TermSpread 0.02 (0.94) -0.00 (-0.09) 0.02 (0.99) -0.01 (-0.23) 0.02 (0.97) -0.00 (-0.11) 
TechBubble 0.22*** (3.58) -0.26*** (-3.24) 0.22*** (3.58) -0.27*** (-3.39) 0.22*** (3.57) -0.27*** (-3.44) 
FinCrisis -0.09 (-1.20) 0.07 (0.77) -0.09 (-1.20) 0.12 (1.34) -0.09 (-1.18) 0.09 (1.01) 
LogAmount  -0.01 (-0.29)  -0.01 (-0.47)  -0.01 (-0.25) 
LogMaturity  0.29*** (4.97)  0.29*** (4.91)  0.29*** (5.13) 
 





Table 8 – continued from previous page 
LogSynSize  -0.07** (-2.39)  -0.07** (2.36)  -0.07** (2.44) 
Constant -1.10** (-2.28) 0.88 (1.51) -1.07* (-2.23) 0.96* (1.72) -1.08** (-2.24) 0.91 (1.62) 
       
ρ   -0.73  -0.74  -0.72 




(χ2 = 0.00) 
 -0.41  
(χ2 = 0.91) 
 -1.99* 




(χ2 = 0.15) 
 0.15 
(χ2 = 0.42) 
 -0.07 
(χ2 = 0.01) 
This table presents tests of association between the security requirements included in private debt and the firm’s level of globalization in countries 
with low institutional quality, countries with high institutional quality, and in non-country specific segments measured using number of segments, 
sales, and assets. The tests are performed using the full sample (N = 15,715) and controlling for the firm’s choice to globalize using the Heckman 
procedure. The dependent variable in the first stage regression is an indicator variable for multinational firms. The exogenous selection 
instruments are: IndPercGlob, StateExp, and Min_Int, and are as defined in Table 5. All other variables are as defined in Table 2. All regressions 
include one-digit SIC code indicator variables. Z-statistics are shown parenthetically following the coefficients. Significance is measured using 2-








Table 9 MNC’s disclosure of operations countries with low institutional quality and private loan 
issuances 
 
 Globalization Measure 
Segments Sales Assets 
Loan -0.152*** (-2.97) -0.020*** (-4.37) -0.006 (-1.52) 
IndPercLow 2.56*** (7.00) 0.250*** (7.86) 0.032 (1.09) 
StateExpLow 0.570 (0.82) 0.302*** (2.84) -0.007 (-0.24) 
Size 0.073*** (3.44) 0.001 (0.63) -0.003 (-0.87) 
Profitability 0.077 (0.94) -0.010 (-0.55) -0.001 (-0.20) 
Leverage -0.228** (-2.07) -0.043*** (-3.22) -0.029 (-1.52) 
Tangibility 1.026*** 6.22) 0.101*** (5.24) 0.047*** (3.31) 
Market-to-Book -0.001 (-0.15) 0.001 (1.18) 0.000 (0.63) 
EDF 0.062 (1.03) 0.016 (0.97) 0.059 (1.04) 
ReturnVolatility 0.870*** (2.86) 0.143*** (3.24) -0.141 (-0.95) 
DefSpread -0.014 (-1.04) -0.004** (-2.10) -0.003 (-1.52) 
TermSpread -0.015 (-1.38) -0.001 (-0.70) 0.001 (0.54) 
TechBubble -0.138*** (-3.29) 0.001 (0.11) -0.009 (-1.26) 
FinCrisis 0.031 (1.13) 0.006 (1.99) -0.005 (-0.61) 
Constant 0.087 (0.13) -0.067* (-1.71) 0.055 (0.92) 
    
N 24,899 24,899 24,899 
Adj. R2 0.070 0.024 0.001 
This table presents tests of changes in management’s disclosure of operations in low institutional quality 
countries in the year’s around a private debt issuance. We measure the level of operations disclosed in 
low institutional quality countries using the number of segments, level of sales, and level of assets 
reported. All regressions include one-digit SIC code indicator variables. IndPercLow and StateExpLow 
are as defined in Table 6, all other variables are as defined in Table 2. T-statistics are shown 
parenthetically following the coefficients. Significance is measured using 2-tailed tests with robust 






Appendix A. – Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Panel A: Measures of Institutional Quality and Globalization 
LowInstSeg Count of segments reported by the firm located in countries with low 
institutional quality 
LowInstSales The firm’s sales in countries with low institutional quality divided by total 
sales. 
LowInstAssets The firm’s assets in countries with low institutional quality divided by total 
assets. 
HighInstSeg Count of segments reported by the firm located in countries with high 
institutional quality. 
HighInstSales The firm’s sales in countries with high institutional quality divided by total 
sales. 
HighInstAssets The firm’s assets in countries with high institutional quality divided by total 
assets. 
NonSpecSeg Count of segments reported by the firm that are reported at a regional or 
continent level. 
NonSpecSales The firm’s sales in segments reported at a regional or continent level divided by 
total sales. 
NonSpecAssets The firm’s assets in segments reported at the regional or continent level divided 
by total assets. 
Panel B: Cost of Debt and Non-Price Loan Terms 
LogSpread The natural log of the All-in-Spread in basis points over LIBOR. 
Secured An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the loan is secured with 
collateral, and 0 otherwise. 
LogMaturity The natural log of the length of the loan in months. 
Covenants Count of the number of covenants included in the loan agreement. 
Panel C: Control Variables 
Size The natural log of the firm’s total assets in millions of U.S. dollars. 
Profitability The ratio of operating income before depreciation to total assets. 
Leverage The ratio of the firm’s long-term debt to total assets. 
Tangibility The ratio of net property, plant, and equipment to total assets. 
Market-to-Book The ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets. 
EDF The expected default frequency, measured as in Bharath & Shumway (2008).  
ReturnVolatility The standard deviation of the firm’s monthly stock returns for the four years 
prior to loan inception. 
DefSpread The difference between the yield on AAA bonds and BAA bonds measured in 
the month of loan origination. 
TermSpread The difference between the yield on ten-year U.S. Treasury bonds and two-year 
U.S. Treasury bonds measured in the month of loan origination. 
TechBubble An indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the loan was originated in 1999 or 
2000, and 0 otherwise. 
FinCrisis An indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the loan was originated in 2007 or 
2008, and 0 otherwise. 
LogAmount The natural log of the amount of the loan facility in millions of U.S. dollars.  





Panel D: Instrumental Variables used in Self-Selection and Propensity Score Matching Analyses 
IndPercGlobal The percentage of firms in the same two-digit SIC code that are global. 
StateExp The ratio of exports from the firm’s home state in year t to total US exports 
in year t. 
Min_Int An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm reports a minority 
interest, and 0 otherwise. 
IndPercLow The percentage of firms in the same two-digit SIC code that report 
operations in a low institutional quality country. 
StateExpLow The ratio of exports from the firm’s home state to low institutional quality 
countries in year t to total US exports in year t. 
 
 
